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OF THE
A1TRE OF THE

This case is an action frJr declaratory relieL injunctive

relating to an

improperly initiated non-judicial foreclosure of a deed of trust by Wells Fargo Bank National
Association (Wells NA), as the claimed beneficiary, and First American Title Company
(FATCO), as trustee, against Charles and Gail Houpt (Houpts). Specifically, Houpts appeal from
the District Courts's grant of summary judgment dismissing Houpts' claims against \\'ells NA
and FATCO. Houpts also appeal from the District Court's decision to go beyond the relief
requested in the pleadings to ascertain \Vells NA' s lien interest on Hcmpts property and to award
\\,'ells NA judgment against the Houpts on the promissory note in the amount of $140,05] .05,
consisting of $62.452.66 in principal and $17,216.20 in interest, as well awarding attorney
of $40,111.50 and $20,270.69 m costs. Finally, Houpts also challenge the District Court's
award of an additional $66,538.50 in attorney fees and $1.564.46 in costs to Respondents.
COtTRSE OF PROCEEDJ,"\GS BELO\\'

On June 22, 2012, Houpts filed their Complaint requesting declaratory and injunctive
relief as well as damages, arising out of a non-judicial Deed of Trust foreclosure (DOT sale)
initiated by \Vells NA and FATCO. R. Vol. L pp. 14-35. The Houpts were in bankruptcy at that
time, but the Bankruptcy Court had lifted the stay, permitting Wells NA and F ATCO to proceed
with the foreclosure that had been initiated prior to the bankruptcy.
On September 4, 2012, ruling from the bench, the District Court denied Houpts' Motion
for Temporary Injunction allowing the Respondents to proceed with the DOT sale. Tr. pp. 86-98.
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However the court allov,ed Houpts · remaining claims arising from a wrongful foreclosure.
indicating:

If the Houpts have suffered or are able to establish damages. if Houpts have sufficient
equity in the property and Wells Fargo Bank somehm.v injures that equity. then Houpts
would be entitled to a legal remedy to recover those damages.
Tr.. p. 95, LL 17-22.
The Court further reiterated that ""there may he damages involved in this lawsuit"'
(recoverable by Houpts) that \Vill be "'addressed in later proceedings."' Tr.. p. 96, LL.23-25.
Rather than completing the DOT sale. Wells NA and FATCO thereafter postponed the
sale for several successi·ve 30 day increments. R .. Vol. 3. p. 484,

~

24. As a part of their efforts

to mitigate damages. Houpts continued to maintain and to market the property.
In June 2013 the Houpts eventually found a willing buyer for a price of $206.383. R ..
Vol. 2, p. 301 ': 13. Houpts filed a motion requesting that the bankruptcy court order the
bankruptcy trustee to abandon any further interest in the property. That motion \Vas granted \Yith
no opposition from the trustee. R., Vol. 3, p. 484, Vol. 2, p.301,

~

9. The Houpts and Wells NA

stipulated to allov,· the sale to proceed, but only on the condition that the sale "'not be construed
as a waiving of any claims, rights or allegations, or an admission of any kind by any of the Parties
against each other or pertaining to the above described action."' R., Vol. 2, p. 302

~

16. The

stipulation also albwed other alleged lien holders of the property to intervene in the District
Court case (Intervenors). Id. The stipulation also directed that the proceeds of the sale, consisting
of $139,669 after all the back due taxes, closing costs and realtor fees had been paid, be
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deposited with the court to be distributed "according to the resolution of the priorities or valid
liens or other considerations. or by future stipulation by the Parties .. , Id.
The Intervenors, including S.R.C. Corp .. Beard St. Clair Gaffney. PA, and the United
States of America (on behalf of the IRS) filed claims on August 26, 2013, September 12, 2013
and September 17, respectively. IL Vol 2, pp. 244A-D. 282-286. Wells NA did not file a claim.
apparently relying upon the still pending non-judicial DOT sale. Later Wells NA affirmed its
failure to file a claim filed with the court, admitting in a brief that "[a]t no time has [Wells NA]
asked the Com1 to enter a money judgment in its favor and against the Houpts personally for the
balance of the Note.'· R., Vol. 4, pp. 787-88.
In September 2013 'vVells NA and FA TCO filed a motion for summary judgment asking
the court to dismiss Houpts· claims, requesting that the proceeds held by the Court be distributed
to \Vells NA. R., Vol. 2, pp. 306-07. On November 12, 2013, Houpts filed a Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment requesting that court grant the declaratory relief prayed for in Count I of the
Complaint and establish the liability of \Vells NA and FATCO for the wrongful foreclosure
claims sought under Count III of the Complaint. R., Vol. 3. p. 442. The Intervenors also filed
cross motions for summary judgment. R. Vol. 1. p. 6, ROA.
On January 7, 2014, the trial court entered its '·Memorandum Decision and Order"
granting Wells NA' s and F ATCO' s motion on summary judgment against the Houpts, but
denying their motion as to the Intervenors. R.,Vol. 4, p. 765. However, in its decision, the court
held that Wells NA did not have a recorded assignment of the DOT until September 4, 2012,
nearly two years after it had initiated the DOT sale. R., Vol. 4., p. 762.
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The Houpts, and Wells NA and FATCO, each filed a Motion to Reconsider. R .. Vol. 4,
pp. 771-76. The court granted Wells· and FATCO's Motion to Reconsider on February 20. 2014.
R., Vol. 5, p. 874. The Court awarded Wells NA $140,051.05. $60,382.19 ofvvhich \Vere fees
and costs related to the DOT foreclosure sale proceedings that had never been completed. Id. In
a June 2, 2014, Memorandum Decision. the court awarded Wells NA an additional $66.538.50 in
attorney fees and $1,564.46 in costs. R., Vol 5. p. 1049. Final judgment \Vas entered June 30.
2014. after \\hich Houpts filed an (amended) appeal. R. Vol. 5, pp. 1057-1059.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

In 1987 the Houpts entered into a Small Business Administration (SBA) guaranteed loan
for their business through United First Savings & Loan Association, the purpose of \v·hich \Vas to
finance the purchase of commercial property located 1954 North Yellowstone High\vay in Idaho
Falls (Property). R., Vol. 3. p. 479, ~1 3.

In 1993 the Houpts consolidated and expanded their SBA loan to $327,080 through
American Bank of Commerce (ABC Note). R., Vol 3, p. 479,

~

4. (Sec March 1 L 1993,

Promissory Note as modified on March 31. 1993. R., Vol. 3, p. 486, Ex. A. The ABC Note was
secured by a Deed of Trust on the Property, with American Bank of Commerce (ABC DOT) as
the Beneficiary and FATCO as Trustee. R., Vol. 3, ~ 5, pp. 479, and 500-506 (Ex. B). ln
addition, ABC DOT obtained additional collateral in the Houpts' company's inventory and
personal property and the Houpts' private residence. Id., p. 479. The monthly payment on the
ABC Note varied between $2,200 and $3,200, depending on the variable interest rate established
by the Promissory Note. R., Vol. 3, p. p. 479, ~i 6.
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In the early part of 2006 the Houpts · business suffered a significant financial setback
\vhen its primary feed supplier chose a different distributor for its product in the Idaho Falls area,
thus curtailing a major source of revenue. R, Vol 3. p. 479

ir 8. Nevenheless, the Houpts

continued to maintain their successful pet retail and grooming: store. R. Vol. 3. p. 480 t,; 9. But
without the feed distribution company they did not have enough cash flow to cover their
obligations. including the ABC Note. Id. Still, by that time the Houpts had significant equity in
both their commercial real property and their residential property, as well as a well-kno\vn and
respected pet retail and grooming company. R., Vol. 3. p. 480 ~: 10. They began to devise a plan
to leverage those assets to maintain a sufficient cash flow. pay their debts. and develop other
promising ventures. Id.
During this period. Chaz Houpt had substantial discussions \Vith \Vells NA represented to him as the current holder of the ABC Note and other secured liens -

which \Vas
about ways

in v~-hich the Houpts could maintain their obligations under the 1993 ABC Note during the cash
flo\V crisis. R.. Vol. 3, p.480111. At that time the Houpts· owned their home free and clear of
any mortgage. Id. The Houpts approached another lender (not \Veils NA) about tapping into
approximately $153,000 of the home's equity. Id. This required a release of the collateral
interest in the residential property given by Houpts as a part of the ABC Note. Id. After the
collateral was released and the new loan was obtained, $53,000 of the new loan proceeds were
paid to the IRS to cover tax deficiencies, and the remaining $100,000 was paid to Wells NA to
help ameliorate the cash flow issues on the ABC Note. Id.
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The 1993 ABC Note was never modified as a result of Houpts · $100.000 payment to
Wells 1\A. nor \Yas there any written agreement or understanding bet,\een \Vells NA and the
Houpts as to how the $100.000 payment would be applied. Under the terms of the note, a prepayment of more than 20% of the principal of the note required Houpts to send a \\Titten notice
of intent at least three weeks prior to the anticipated prepayment date. Tr.. p. 480-81

ir 12. This

newr occurred. Id. Rather. Houpts understood that the $100,000 payment would result in both
the release of the collateral on their residence and a reduction of the monthly payment on the
ABC Note. Id. Accordingly. the Houpts continued to make payments on the note of around
$1,600 per month. Id.
Prior to October 2010 the Houpts did not receive any written notice of default from Wells
1\A. other than a letter dated December 13. 2007. Tr.. Vol 3, p. 481

i: 13, and pp.

507-08, Ex. C.

Upon receiving this letter, Chaz Houpt contacted representatives of the bank to resolve the issue.
No further default notices ,vere sent until October 2010. Tr.. Vol. 3, p. 481

~

13.

Having devised some short term fixes to their immediate cash flmv problems, Houpts
then focused on the long term solution. Tr., Vol. 3, p. 481

~

14. They developed and began

executing a plan to sell their grooming and pet retail business and their commercial property. Id.
They obtained a realtor who ultimately valued and listed the property at $389,000. Tr., Vol. 3, pp.
509-513 (Ex. D). They obtained a broker specializing in business acquisitions who ultimately
valued and listed their pet retail and grooming business at $270,000. Id. pp. 514-518 (Ex. E).
Under this plan, Houpts anticipated obtaining enough revenue to pay off all of their creditors,
including the ABC Note holder and other lien holders. Tr., Vol 3., p. 481
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~

14. Houpts also

anticipated a significant amount of remaining profit in which they could live on and concentrate
on developing other ventures. Id. i\·k Houpt apprised representatives from Wells NA of this
plan. who expressed no objection to it Id. \Vells NA still sent no notice of default Id.
On October 18. 2010. Houpts unexpectedly received a ·'Notice of Default" and .. Notice of
Trustee· s Sale" issued by FA TCO on behalf of \Veils NA. \vho ,vas designated as the current
beneficiary of the Deed of Trust under the ABC DOT (2010 DOT sale Notice). A trustee's sale
\Vas set for February 17. 201 L Tr.. Vol. 3. p. 481

4l 15. pp. 519-521 (Ex. F). The 2010 DOT sale

Notice alleged that Houpts default consisted of ·'failure to make the monthly payment of
$1 .422.04 due for the 8th day of November. 2008 and a like sum of $1.422.04 due for the

g11i

day

of each and every month thereafter" and a "·failure" to "pay all taxes, assessments'· without
stating such alleged amount. Id. The 2010 DOT sale Notice also listed ABC as the Beneficiary of
the 1993 ABC DOT. Id. There was no stated amount of the "unpaid principal balance" or of
accrued interest. Id. At the time of this notice, Houpts were not in default in their respective notes
with other lien holders. Id.
Unbeknownst to the Houpts at the time of the 2010 DOT sale notices, \Vells NA had
never been assigned the beneficial interest in the ABC DOT. R., Vol 4, p. 701. l\forcover,
Houpts were also unaware at that time that in April 2010, several months prior to the 2010 DOT
sale Notice, Wells NA. had petitioned the SBA for a pre-liquidation payment on its SBA
guarantee. Id. And in May 2010, the SBA paid Wells NA a $56,240.50 guarantee based an
alleged amount of principal O\ving on the note of $67,395.01. R., Vol. 3, p. 527 ~ 11: p. 528;
and Vol. 4, p. 616: R., Vol. 5, pp. 923. This principal balance is a different amount than what
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was indicated on the Notice of Default. R., Vol. 3, p. 481, -: 15, and pp. 519-521 (Ex.

F).

Prior

to proceeding with the DOT sale. Wells NA ordered a ''Trustee's Sale Guarantee" from FATCO.
R.. Vol. 3. pp. 535-540. Obtaining this guarantee required a search of the records for the rights
and liens pertaining to the Property. Id ... Schedule B'' of the guarantee affirms ABC as the
beneficiary \\:ith no subsequent assignees. R., Vol. 3, p. 538. Notwithstanding the knowledge of
this critical information. FATCO proceeded with the DOT sale acting for Wells NA, not ABC.
On February 16, 2011. Houpts filed for bankruptcy. effectiwly staying the DOT sale set
for the next day. R., Vol. 3. p. 482.
Id ..

i; 18.

i; 17.

Houpts initially filed their bankruptcy under Chapter 7.

Despite not having been assigned the beneficiary of the ABC DOT, Wells N/\ filed a

proof of claim in the bankrukptcy based on the ABC DOT (\\hich it later amended.) Id. Upon the
advice of the bankruptcy trustee. Houpts converted their filing to a debt reorganization under
Chapter 13 in April of 2011. Id. Again. Houpts prepared a plan wherein their business, property
and other assets would be sold to pay off the creditors, leaving funds to pursue future ventures.
Id.
The Houpts' Chapter 13 plan was met with aggressive opposition by Wells NA. R., Vol.
3, p. 446

~i~

2-8. Wells NA filed numerous motions and objections with the bankruptcy court,

many of which were completely unnecessary and drove up the costs for the Houpts and other
creditors. Id.

14 . Wells NA protracted the process, improperly affected the Houpts' attempts to

resolve their issues with the creditors and bankruptcy trustee. Id. Its conduct was a major
contributor in defeating Houpts' attempts to restructure their debt under Chapter 13. Id.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 13

~I 5.

Absent Wells NA' s strenuous objections, concerns with the Chapter 13 plan by other creditors
including the CS Trustee would have likely been resolved. Id.
Wells NA' s extreme and costly efforts persisted. The Houpts · bankruptcy attorney noted
that, in all of the many hundreds of bankruptcy cases that he has hand led. he has never witnessed
conduct by a bank as aggressive and egregious as Wells NA· s conduct in the IJoupts · case. Id.

,r1

2-3. \Velis NA proceeded with an auction of the Houpts' inventory and much of their business
equipment in November of 2011. R., Vol. 3, p. 483

~

19. At one point, \\/ells NA convinced the

bankruptcy trustee to chain the doors of Houpts Property. It also \vanted to seize all of I Ioupts
grooming equipment which would have literally left them, and the numerous retail animals (that
is. the dogs. cats. rabbits, and so forth) out on the street and ,vith no resources to operate their
business or to earn income. Id., R. Vol 3., p. 446,

~

6. Houpts also suffered other harms

including losing two valuable lots they owned, some vehicles and substantial amount of interest
accruing for back due taxes owed to the IRS, among other things. Id. pp. 483-84.
Houpts eventually ,,·ere able to lease a small commercial store front space to conduct
their grooming business, but continued to maintain their commercial property. Id. , 21.
Nevertheless, by this time virtually all value had been lost in their business. Id. At one point, the
bankruptcy trustee attempted to auction the Property for $175,000, a fraction of its value. Id. p.
446,

~

7. Another appraisal conducted by Wells NA in April of 2012 (some 14 months after the

January 2011 appraisal of $315,000) appraised the property "as-is" at $220,000. Id. pp. 54 7-551
(Ex. D).
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In February of 2012. having had enough, the Bankruptcy Court discharged the bankruptcy
and lifted the stay on the foreclosure proceedings. Id. p. 483 fj 21. F ATCO issued an '·Amended
Notice of Default" and ·'Notice of Trustee's Sale" on March 15. 2012, setting the property for
auction on July 17. 2012 (2012 DOT sale Notice). Tr.. Vol 3, pp. 522-23 (Ex. G). The 2012
DOT sale Notice differed substantially from the previous DOT Notice. stating the default to be
.. failure to make the monthly payment of $1 .433.04 due on the 8th day of March 2009. and like
sum (due every month thereafter. f Id. The notice further alleged an '·unpaid balance of
$62.452.66. accrued interest in the amount of $11.338.06. legal and other fees in the amount of
$50.381.82 for a total amount due of $124.172.54 with interest accruing at the per diem rate of
$11.26 after Fehruary 16. 2011. Id.
Both the principal balance and the .. date of default'' had direct effect on the amount of
outstanding interest. Under the terms of the ABC Note, the interest rate becomes .. fixect·· at the
date of default. Id. p. 487, Ex. A, Sec. 4. ~: 1. Therefore. because the principal balance was not
kno,vn. and as a result of the numerous alleged dates of default stated by \Veils NA, the rnrious
amounts of outstanding interest alleged by the bank is inaccurate and likely overstated.
Moreover. there has never been any accounting for th $56,240 SBA guarantee payment in early
of 2011 in calculating such interest. Finally, there has never been a proper accounting for the
$100,000 payment made by Houpts in April of 2006, that is, whether it should have been applied
to the principal or whether it should be applied to future loan payments (to keep Houpts out of
default.)
On August 31, 2012 (the day before Labor Day weekend), Wells NA's attorney Trevor
Hart notified the Court by e-mail its intention to record an "Assignment of the Trust Deed" from
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Wells Northwest to Wells NA on September 4. 2012. R., Vol 3, pp. 526 ~ 9. 601-604 !Ex H).
This \\as sent after Houpts had filed their Complaint, after they had filed a motion for
preliminary injunction. and after all of the briefs thereon had been filed with the Court. and was
sent a mere four days before the hearing scheduled on the motion. The subject of the motion and
the briefs was Wells NA ·slack of status as beneficiary under the ABC DOT, which was clearly
demonstrated by the material before the court. and was not disputed. Mr. Hart's stated intention
to the court for that recording was to obYiate the need for the court to rule on that issue. ld. The
assignment was recorded a mere fiye minutes before the hearing. Tr., p. 49, LL. 16-24. However.
Wells NA and FATCO continued the DOT sale process initiated in October 2010 (as amended
and re-initiated in March of2012.)

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court err in dismissing Houpts' claims for declaratory relief and

wrongful non-judicial foreclosure on summary judgment?
2.

Did the District Court lack jurisdiction to a\Yard Respondent Wells NA

$140,051.50 and the additional benefits obtained in the stipulated sale of Houpts · property?
3.

Did the District Court err in awarding Respondents' attorney fees and costs?

ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Houpts seeks their attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-120(3) (commercial transaction).
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ARGUMENT
L

STAJ\DARD OF REVIE'W

As indicated many times by the Idaho Supreme Court with regard to reviewing
summary judgments:
When reviewing a grant of summary judgment. this Court applies the same
standard of review used by the district court in ruling on the motion. A grant of
summary judgment is warranted where "the pleadings, depositions. and
admissions on file. together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the
burden of proving the absence of an issue as to any material fact. The facts must
be liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party.

Grazer v. Jones, 294 P.3d 184. 190, 154 Idaho 58, 64 (2013) (citation omitted).
With regard to motions to reconsider, this Court has said:
"[W]hen the district court grants summary judgment and then denies a motion for
reconsideration, 'this Court must determine whether the evidence presented a genuine
issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment. ' This means the Court reviews the
district court· s denial of a motion for reconsideration de novo. "

Sales v. Peabody,

Idaho

. 335 P.3d 40, 43 (2014) (citations omitted).

The party disputing the award of attorney fees has the burden of showing an abuse of
discretion. Smith v. Mitton. 140 Idaho 893, 901, 104 P.3d 367, 375 (2004). When reviewing
an exercise of discretion, a court on appeal conducts a three-tiered inquiry. The lower court must
have (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted ,vi thin the outer boundaries
of its discretion and consistently with legal standards applicable to specific choices available to
it, and (3) reached its conclusion by an exercise of reason. Dunagan v. Dunagan, 147 Idaho 599,
213 P.3d 384 (2009).
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II.

THE DISTRICT Cot:RT LACKED BASIS FOR DIS"HSSI:\G HorPTS' CLA[MS FOR
DECLARATORY RELIEF A'.'.D DAMAGES FOR RESPO'.'.DEYfS' \\'RO!\'GfliL No~JlJDJCIAL FORECLOSl"RE.

A.

A Deed of Trust Foreclosure Require Strict Compliance \Vith the Statutory

Provisions.
The specific non-judicial deed of trust sale procedures are set forth in Idaho Code § 45150 l ct seq .. including the relevant parts ofldaho Code § 45-1505. This states that a trustee may
only foreclose a trust deed when "the trust deed, any assignments of the trust deed by the trustee
or the beneficiary and any appointment of a successor trustee are recorded in the mortgage

records in the couuties in which the property described in the deed is situated:· Id at ( 1 )
(emphasis added). The trustee must issue a notice that "shall set forth ... the names of the
grantor. trustee and beneficiary in the trust deed ... the default for \Vhich the foreclosure is
made ... [and] the sum owing on the obligation secured by the trust deed.'' id. § 1506( 4)(a), ( d)
and (e) (emphasis added). Upon execution of the trustee's sale, the beneficiary may only bid the
amount of the default due under the deed oftrust plus "costs and expenses actually incurred in

enforcing the terms of the obligation (of the deed)." id. § 1506(12) (emphasis added).
The Idaho Supreme Court has affirmed that:
the procedures to foreclose on trust deeds outside of the judicial process provide the
express-lane alternative to foreclosure in the judicial system and strip borrowers of
protections embedded in a judicial foreclosure. As our Court of Appeals has correctly
observed, strict compliance with the notice provisions is required.

Federal Home Loan Afortg. Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 137 P.3d 429 fn. 1 (2006). See also,
Frazier v. Neilsen & Co., 118 Idaho 104, 106 (Ct. App. 1990); Roos v. Belcher, 79 Idaho 473,
4 79 (1958); ("strict compliance \Vith the terms of both the trust deed and that statute is
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required ... ): Garret v. Soucie. 46 Idaho .289 (1928). In fact. such requirements are based on the
constitutionally protected rights of due process. See Roos. supra, at 478--479.
A party who has not complied with the strict requirements set forth in a non-judicial
foreclosure cannot benefit from such conduct, regardless of whether the claims are made before
or after the sale of the property. Federal Home Loan .\long C'mp

1·.

Appel. 143 Idaho 42, 47.

137 P.3d 429. 434 (2006; (emphasis added). Courts have held that a party that improperly
conducts a non-judicial 1<.)reclosure may be subject to damages. See. e.g.. Arabia v. BAC Honu!

Loans Servicing, LP .. 208 Cal. App. 4th 462. 477 (Cal. App. 2012): Schroeder v. E..,:celsior

Jfanagemenr Group. LLC. 86433-1. 86710-1 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Feb.28.2013); Hughes v.
OneWesr Bank, A.130897 (Cal. App. March 13, 2012) (We agree \Vith plaintiff that mistakes in
performance of the ministerial acts set forth in the nonjudicial foreclosure statute may result in a
void sale and an award of appropriate damages.")

B.

Houpts Provided Evidence Supporting the Elements of Their Claims for

Declaratory Relief and Liability.
Houpts' Complaint consisted of three counts. including declaratory relief under LC.§ 101202 (Count 1), injunctive relief under JRCP § 65 (Count ff), and a claim for damages for
\vrongful execution of a foreclosure (Count III

inartfully titled as '·Slander of Title."") R. Vol 1,

pp. 17-19.
The District Court denied Houpts' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, effectively
dismissing Count II of Houpts' Complaint, in essence holding that the Defendants' improper
foreclosure of the property did not necessarily preclude Houpts from pursuing damages and
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therefore Houpts were not irreparably harmed. 1 TL p. 95, LL 17:22. However. in large part. the

Court· s ruling did not affect the two remaining counts of Houpts · Complaint.
Houpts· remaining claims. after being denied the injunction included relief sought under
Count I and Count IIL \\ere:

Count I:
a.

Order declaring Wells NA was not the beneficiary under the ABC Deed and had
no beneficial interest in the Property:

b.

An Order declaring that the non-judicial foreclosure being conducted by
defendants is improper and should be permanently stayed: and

c.

any other equitable relief or declaration of rights deemed appropriate by the Court.

Count III - a monetary judgment jointly and separately against Defendants. compensating Plaintiff for any and all losses, damages. and costs suffered by Plaintiff as a result of
Defendants· improper conduct.
·
R. Vol 1, pp. 18-19.

Houpts presented evidence supporting their claims for summary judgment. Of primary
note. Houpts shmved that \Vells NA did not have a recorded assignment as beneficiary of the
deed of trust prior to initiating the non-judicial foreclosure proceedings.2 In fact, the District
Court affirmed that Wells NA did not have a recorded assignment of the DOT until September 4.
2012, nearly two years after it had initiated the DOT sale complained of. R., Vol. 4, p. 762. As

The District Court likely erred in denying the preliminary injunction on that basis
because allowing the deed of trust sale to go forward deprived the Houpts of their right of
redemption under Idaho Code § 11-403, therefore causing irreparable harm.
1

There is even a question as to whether Wells NA had ever been assigned the lien right.
It has never actually provided substantiated evidence of its chain of title to the original
promissory note. R., Vol. 1, pp. 15-16 ,ii; 6-13.
2
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Houpts
lacked

been granted a declaration that \Vells

s

"beneficial interest" when it proceeded with a DOT sale.
Additionally. Houpts provided evidence

not disputed

that Wells NA·s Notice(s) of

Default did not accurately state either the default (if any existed) or the '·sum owing." and/or the
principal balance O\ved on the note. See Statement of Facts. infra. The respectiw Notices of
Default themselves contain discrepancies in the amount of default, date of the default. and
principal balance owed. Id. Moreover, Houpts had provided evidence. H'as admitted by Wells
NA. that many months prior to the initial notice of default it had received a pre-liquidation
payment on the SBA guarantee that nearly wiped out the alleged debt. Id. (Again. see R .. Vol. 5.
p. 923.) In addition. given the payment history and conduct bet\veen the parties, there is at least a
question of fact as to whether Houpts were in default particularly, given the $100,000 payment
made by Houpts. Id
Given these significant discrepancies, the Court should have granted declaratory relief to
Houpts on the lack of a proper Notice of Default and Notice of Trustee's Sale. v:hich are the
foundation upon which the right to a non-judicial foreclosure are based. At the very least, Houpts
provided disputed evidence in support of their claims, and should not have been deprived their
right to a trial to present such evidence for the full consideration of the court and implications
therein.
Houpts also provided evidence in support of their damages for Wells NA's wrongful
conduct. This was also disregarded by the trial court. Id. The improper foreclosure proceedings
ultimately resulted in a major decline in the equity and value of Houpts property, the loss of other

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 21

properties. and their business. Id. Houpts should ha\·e been afforded the opportunity to present
those damage claims at trial.
C.

The District Court Should Not Have Held \Velis NA's and FATCO's Failure

to Complete the Non-Judicial Foreclosure Against the Houpts.

In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court held that Wells NA was indeed not the
beneficiary of the ABC DOT at the time it and FATCO initiated the non-judicial foreclosure. But
then it effectively sidestepped Houpts · proven claims by holding that those claims were moot
because Respondents never completed the foreclosure. R., VoL 4. p. 761. In so doing, the district
court cited authority from jurisdictions outside ofidaho (Texas. New York and New Hampshire)
suggesting that there is no claim for an ·'attempted \\TOngful foreclosure." Id 760
Howewr. none of the decisions cited by the District Court apply to this ease. The cited
decisions all involve facts wherein the debtor "remained in possession" or '·did not lose
possession"' of the property. Medrano v. BAC Home Loans S'ervicing. LP., Civ. A. No.
3:10-CV-02565-M (BF), 2012 WL 4174890 (N.D. Tex. Aug.IO, 2012) ("Plaintiffs never lost
possession of the Property and are seeking damages for an attempted wrongful foreclosure.") In
re Residential Capital, LLC. 501 B.R. 531 Bkrtcy. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (the Gilberts are still in

possession of their property, so it is unclear what the basis for damages would be.)
In this case, Houpts did lose possession of their property. The loss of their property may
not have result from an actual deed of trust sale, which Respondents were consistently
postponing in 30 day increments, but by the virtue of a stipulation of the parties allowing a
voluntary sale. That stipulation made it explicitly clear, however, that it must "not be construed
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as a waiving of any claims, rights or allegations. or an admission of any kind by any of the Parties
against each other or pertaining to the above described action." R. Vol. 2, p. 302.
In other words, the District Court should not have held the agreement to a voluntary sale
against the Houpts, ,vhere the Houpts had expressly reserved all claims in this action. Houpts did
not enter into the agreement to nullify or vvaivc its wrongful foreclosure claims, but as a good
faith attempt to mitigate their damages. Jn any case. the result was the same as if the foreclosure
was completed: the Houpts lost possession of their property. The court should have treated the
matter as if the foreclosure was completed for purposes of Houpts · \Vrongful non-judicial
foreclosure claims.
Additionally. the trial court erroneously held that \\'ells NA· s recording of an "assignment of beneficial interest" in the ABC DOT a mere five minutes before the September 12.2012
preliminary injunction hearing, and nearly two years after it had initiated the DOT sale, magically
cured the defects in the notices that had been given years prior, mooting the issue of the propriety
of the notices. R. Vol 3, pp. 526, 601-604, Ex H. Tr. p. 49. LL. 16-24. (Assuming, arguendo, that
the court was correct, the recording did not moot the other deficiencies in the notice.) The court
provided no authority that allmvs an alleged beneficiary to retroactively correct the required
conditions under the statute granting a right to a non-judicial foreclosure.
In truth, this last-ditch effort by \Veils NA only served as an admission that it nev-er had
the right to proceed with the non-judicial foreclosure in the first place. It is also particularly
pertinent given the fact that, at that time, Wells NA was attempting to add $50,381.82 in fees and
costs to the default related to the non-judicial foreclosure costs when it had no statutory right to
proceed. See the 2012 DOT sale Notice, R., Vol. 3, pp. 522-23 (Ex. G).
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The District Court
Houpts · cross

Addressed Houpts' Claims Against FA TCO.

for summary judgment also sought liability against FATCO

violating its fiduciary duties as the trustee. The District Court did not address Houpts' claims
and arguments against FATCO, instead dismissing the claims \vithout any discussion. This was
an error by the court
In Idaho. in the performance of his trust a trustee '"cannot do anything in derogation of
[the trust] and cannot ··acquire ... obligations superior to his title as trustee.'· Nampa Investment

Corporation v. Demming ixploration Co .. 50 Idaho 46: 49 293 P. 326, 329 (I 930). In the
context of a non-judicial foreclosure, the trustee ·'has an obligation to give accurate information"
and to not act "·in a manner \vhich defeats the trustor's rights.'· Diamond v. S'andpoim Title
Inc .. 132Idaho 145.151.968P.2d240,246(1998).
.
,

,

,

'

,

FATCO was the named trustee in the ABC DOT. R., Vol. 1, p.

In the deed of trust

the Houpts as ''Grantor ... constitutes and appoints the Trustee (FA TCO) as his agent and
attorney in fact" to fulfill the covenants and obligations under the deed of trust, in particular the
requirements that must be met in the process of a deed of trust sale. R., Vol 1, p. 22, Sec. 4.
FATCO clearly violated its fiduciary duties in this case. Prior to issuing the 2010 Notice
of Default, FATCO prepared a "Trustee's Sale Guarantee'· for Wells NA. R., Vol. 3, pp. 535-38.
FA TCO researched the title and \Vas aware that the recorded beneficiary of the ABC DOT was
American Bank of Commerce and not Wells NA. Id. p. 538. FATCO therefore had no authority
as trustee under the DOT to execute a foreclosure sale on behalf of Wells NA. It did so anyway.
FATCO also failed to provide accurate information in each of its respective DOT sale
Notices. Its actions therefore served to defeat Ifoupts' rights as the trustor or grantor of the ABC
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DOT. FA TCO should therefore be held liable for damages. as yet ascertained, it caused to
Houpts because of its fiduciary breaches.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO

$206,000

A \VARD \VELLS NA THE MORE THAN

IN BENEFITS FROl\l THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY.

At the same time the lower court mooted Houpts' claims for damages under Count III of
its Complaint. it awarded Wells NA a sizable judgment and other benefits, as if the judicial
foreclosure sale had been completed.~ Because \Velis NA had never pled for such relief to the
trial court, it lacked jurisdiction to make this judgment.
Even \\·hen Wells NA became aware of the errors and discrepancies that prevented it
from relying upon the non-judicial foreclosure it had initiated. rather than file a counterclaim
seeking judicial foreclosure under Idaho Code § 11-402, and rather that re-starting the nonjudicial foreclosure sale properly, and even rather than just pleading a counterclaim asserting a
right to damages for breach of the Promissory Note, Wells NA instead elected to continue relying
upon the claim that the initial non-judicial foreclosure proceeding was valid.
Unlike the Intervenors in the case, \Vells NA never filed a claim with the court on its
alleged lien with Houpts. R. Vol. 4, pp. 787-88. Instead, Wells NA elected to put all of its eggs

Its important to note that Wells NA' s actual benefit or "award" from the Court was not
the approximately $140,000 that was on deposit with the Court, but at the very least the full
$206,383 from the sale. Monies from the sale that were not deposited with the Court were used
to pay the realtor and closing costs, as well as reimbursement of and payment of owed taxes. (Id.)
Wells NA would not have been provided such benefits had the DOT sale process been
completed. In addition, Wells NA benefitted from the Houpts' considerable time and resources
spent in maintaining and showing the property, as well as the legal fees involved in putting the
sale and stipulation together. The District Court gave no consideration whatsoever to these
additional benefits it provided to Wells NA at the Houpts' expense.
3
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one basket

it

pursued a non-judicial

property.

A.

The District Court Erred in Asserting that Wells NA's Alleged Lien Interest

Had Been Tried by Implied Consent.
Even though the court held that there ,vas never a completed non-judicial (or judicial)
foreclosure of the Property, Wells NA was nevertheless allowed to collect on its alleged (and
disputed) lien without ever ''exhausting the security .. pursuant to Idaho Code§ 6-101. 4 The
purpose of this statute is explained by the Idaho Court of Appeals as follows:
Idaho's one-action rule requires that a mortgagee must fully exhaust the security before
proceeding against the debtor on the underlying debt. See IC § 6-101. 'To allow the
creditor to retain the security \\ithout ascertaining its value, and then to give him a
judgment for the full amount of the debt, is contrary to the policy ofldaho law requiring
foreclosure prior to recovery on the debt." Eastern Idaho Production Credit Assoc. v.
Placerton Inc., 100 Idaho 863. 868, 606 P.2d 967, 972 (1980). "The creditor may not
simply sue on the debt and collect by execution on the judgment." Quintana v. Anthony,
109 Idaho 977, 979-80, 712 P.2d 678, 680-81 (Ct.App.1985). The parties are in
agreement that this rule is also applicable to an action to collect on a promissory note
secured by a deed of trust.
l'vfcCray v. Twitchell, 112 Idaho 787. 789, 735 P.2d 1098, 100 (Idaho App. 1987)

In their Motion for Reconsideration, Houpts pointed out Wells NA's failure to comply
,vith the one-action rule in collecting on its alleged debt. R., Vol. 4, pp. 779-881. Again, Wells
NA's Response to Houpts' Motion to Reconsider openly admits that:
At no time has (Wells NA) asked the Court to enter a money judgment in its favor and
against the Houpts personally for the balance of the Note.

Often referred to as the "one action" rule, Idaho Code § 6-101 states that "there can be
but one action for the recovery of any debt, or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage
upon real estate . . ."
4

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 26

trial court· s response to

\\as to assert that the

had been tried bv

the ''implied or express" consent of the parties via the stipulation entered into by the parties. R.,
Vol. 5, pp. 858-59. The court relied upon Am. Jur. 2d Pleading§ 885 for its authority. but it
more properly should have considered IRCP § l S(b). which provides that'"[ w]hen issues not
raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated
in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings.'· Id (emphasis added).
In making that ruling. the court disregarded well-established authority that the Rule l 5(b)
"'implied amendment" to the pleadings only applies when there has been an actual trial of the
case. and it is expressly inappropriate in the context of a summary judgment motion. See Estes v.

Barry, 132 Idaho 82. 86. 96 7 P.2d 284. 288 ( 1998) ( I.R.C.P. § l 5(b) has been held to apply only
to unpled theories that are litigated at a trial on the merits, and not to factual issues raised in a
motion for summary judgment.)
Thus, regardless of how the court interpreted the stipulation between the parties, it lacked
both the authority and the jurisdiction to decide Wells NA· s lien claim, especially where no such
claim had ever been properly pled.
The Houpts certainly did not consent to allow the Court to determine Wells NA's asserted
lien interest and enter judgment against them based on ifs wrongful non-judicial foreclosure
claims. In fact, the stipulation specifically prevents that from occurring. It ensures that it ''not be
construed as a waiving of any claims, rights or allegations, or an admission of any kind by any of
the Parties against each other or pertaining to the abo-ve described action." R., Vol. 2, p. 302.
The stipulation also directed the court to distribute the proceeds "as according to the resolution of
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the priorities or valid liens or other considerations" thus envisioning the distinct possibility that
if Houpts prevailed, the proceeds should in fact be distributed to them. Id.
As stated previously, Wells NA never elected to judicially claim a lien right against
Houpts: at all stages it elected to proceed non-judicially. Houpts· primary claim against \\/ells
NA was that the non-judicial foreclosure ,vas improper from the start. Thus, the only question
before the court \Vas to ascertain whether the non-judicial foreclosure sale was proper. If the
answer was "no:· then Wells NA could not exercise its lien right through the non-judicial
foreclosure, and it had no valid lien. The court effectively answered that question '·no,'' by
admitting that Wells NA did not have a recorded interest in the Property at the times that the
foreclosure ,,as initiated and re-initiated.
\\'ells NA had to live by the choice that it made to pursue its alleged interest, and it was
error by the District Court to allow Wells NA another avenue never properly pied or pursued, and
for which the court had no jurisdiction to consider.
B.

Even if Wells NA's "Lien Right" Had Been Tried b)· Implied or Express

Consent of the Parties, the Court Erred in Determining the Amount of the Lien on
Summary Judgment, And Should Not Have Added \Veils NA's Exorbitant Fees and Costs.

Even assuming that the District Court had jurisdiction to award Wells NA a judgment
based upon its alleged lien, the court not only accepted without question Wells NA· s alleged
amount of the lien and interest, but also added an exorbitant amount of fees and costs to the lien.
This was clearly an error, particularly on a summary judgment motion.
Again. the singular focus of Houpts in their Complaint and in response to the
Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment ,vas to identify errors with the non-judicial
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foreclosure. But in so doing, the Houpts at the very least raised numerous factual issues as to the
balance amount owed under the Promissory Note. the existence of a default and the amount of
the default.
First Houpts presented evidence. admitted by Wells NA, that the SBA had paid over
$56.000 toward the secured note prior to \Vells NA· s and FA TCff s initiation of the non-judicial
foreclosure. This payment left, at best, only a few thousand dollars O\ving on the note.
Second. the respective --notices of default" issued by the Respondents contained
discrepancies as to the balance owing under the note, the dates of the defaults, and the amount in
default.
Third, Houpts presented evidence that was ignored by the court as to the $100.000
payment made on the note. and never considered whether this was a ·'prepayment'· or merely
advance payments of the installments due under the note.
Fourth, Houpts presented evidence that should have been admitted by the court under the
public records exception set forth in I.R.E. § 803(8), consisting of SBA records and
correspondence that illustrated additional discrepancies with regard to the amount of the lien and
default.
It is axiomatic that the evidence on a motion for summary judgment should be viewed in
a light most favorable to the non-moving party. in this case the Houpts. If the court had done that,
the principal balance due should at least have been reduced by about $56,000.00 and the interest
charged should have been reduced to a small fraction of that claimed. Instead, it completely
ignored that evidence.
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short, given

numerous material issues

fact

the amount

the

the default (vvhich fixed the interest rate), and the amounts in default. it \Vas
inappropriate for the court determine the amount due to Wells NA on summary judgment.
It was particularly improper for the court to award massive fees and costs. essentially

added onto the lien, based on a non-judicial foreclosure that was never completed. Wells NA
alleged that it was entitled to $22J 12.09 in '"bank incurred costs for commencing foreclosure:'
including the following: $12,265 total in '·environmental inspection and reviews .. of the
property; $5,900 in ·'appraisals"; and $3. 94 7.09 in '·foreclosure costs" paid to "First American ..
and "Title First" for a foreclosure never completed. R. Vol.

p. 334. $20.270.68 of those costs

were awarded to \Vells NA by the court. R. Vol 4, p. 874.
In addition. Wells NA sought $42.674.50 in attorney fees to be added to the lien, all
allegedly related to the uncompleted non-judicial foreclosure, $40,111.50 of which \Vas av,arded
by the Court. R. Vol. 5, pp. 871. 874. In short, the District Court added $60,390.18 in fees and
costs to the principal of a lien that was at best $62,452.66, and under the rules should have been
seen to be well under $10,000.
It is dubious how much of these costs and expenses

of the lien

nearly equal to the alleged amount

were truly necessary and reasonable in enforcing the terms of Houpts' obligations

under the deed of trust and therefore justified under IC 45 § 1506(12). Much of the attorney fees
incurred by Wells NA were a result of its overly aggressive and unnecessary conduct during the
course of the bankruptcy, all at a time when it was not the true beneficiary under the ABC DOT,
and therefore did not even have a properly perfected claim in the bankruptcy.
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Regardless, under the specific terms of the ABC DOT itself: Wells NA is not entitled to
any of the aforementioned fees and costs. Paragraph 4 of the ABC DOT sets fonh the process
for a deed of trust foreclosure sale. R. Vol 1. p. 22. Paragraph 5 only entitles the Beneficiary of
the deed of trust its ·'costs and expenses .. related the sale "in the event of a sale .. , Id. (emphasis
added) Moreover, paragraph 6 explicitly states that the "expenses incurred by the Beneficiary for
the purpose of protecting or maintaining said property and reasonable attorneys· fees" are only
allocated from "the proceeds of any sale of said property in accordance \\·ith Paragraph 4." Id.
The District Court based its award on a finding that no foreclosure sale \Vas ever
completed. It then proceeded, however, to assert jurisdiction to determine Wells NA·s lien right.
Even if it had such jurisdiction. under the document that gave right to the lien Wells NA had no
right to the fees and costs that it was attempting to add. It \Vas at the very least an error fix the
court to include the $60,390 in fees and costs as a part of that lien.

IV.

No FACTllAL OR LEGAL SUPPORT EXISTS FOR THE HARSH APPLICATION OF JtJDICIAL
ESTOPPEL.

In its Memorandum Decision on ~lotions for Reconsideration, the District Court added
an additional basis of the harsh remedy of judicial estoppel for granting Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment. In essence, the court relied upon the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling in
}vfcCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891,303 P.3d 578 (2013) to suggest that Houpts' failure to

amend their bankruptcy schedules to add their claims against Respondents itself constituted a
basis for judicially estopping Houpts from making their claims. R. Vol. 5, p. 862.
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In .\fcCa/lisrer. which unlike this case im olved a medical malpractice claim that arose
prior to the bankruptcy. the Supreme Court laid out the judicial estoppel doctrine as applied in
Idaho.
Idaho adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel in Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277
P.2d 561 (1954). Judicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one
position, then subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible vvith the first.
A. & J Const. Co. v. Wood. 141 Idaho 682,684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). The policy
behind judicial estoppel is to protect " the integrity of the judicial system, by protecting
the orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of the judicial
proceeding." ld. at 685. 116 P.3d at 15 (quoting Robertson Supply Inc. v. Nicholls, 13 I
Idaho 99, lOL 952 P.2d 914. 916 (Ct.App.1998)). Broadly accepted, it is intended to
prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the legal system. Id.; see also 31 C.J.S.
Estoppel and \Vaiver § 186 (2012). Judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial
system, not tbe litigants; therefore, it is not necessary to demonstrate individual prejudice.
\Vood, 141 Idaho at 686, 116 P.3d at 16 (citing Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
270 F.3d 778 (9th Cir.2001 )). Judicial estoppel applies to inconsistent positions taken in
bankruptcy proceedings. Id. (relying on decisions from numerous courts holding "privity
... [though] often present in judicial estoppel cases. [is] not required." Burnes v. Pemco
Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F .3d 1282. 1286 (11th Cir.2002) ).

AlcCal/ister v. Dixon, 303 P.3d 581, 154 Idaho 894 (Idaho 2013)
The }vfrCallister Court then proceeded to explain how this doctrine applies to bankruptcy
proceedings, i, e, that it prevents the concealment of potential assets (in the form of claims) from
the trustee whose duty is to collect on those assets on behalf of the unsecured creditors, holding
that such claims belong to the trustee. Id. at 581-583. Additionally, the Court indicates that
Judicial estoppel takes into account .. , what the [estopped] party knew, or should have
known, at the time the original position \Vas adopted. Thus, the knmvledge that the party
possesses, or should have possessed, at the tirne the state1nent is made is determinative as
to whether that person is 'playing fast and loose' lvith the court. Judicial estoppel,
however, should only be applied when the party maintaining the inconsistent position
either did have, or was chargeable with,full knowledge of the attendant facts prior to
adopting the initial position. Bankruptcy rules require disclosing all existing and potential
assets. 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(1), 541(a)(7). This duty continues during the pendency of the
bankruptcy. Judicial estoppel will be imposed when the debtor has knowledge of enough
facts to know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the
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hankruptcy. but fails to amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify the cause
of action as a contingent asset.
Id. 154 Idaho 895: 303 P.3d 582 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Additionally.
\Ve have consistently rejected opportunities to inquire into a party's subjective state of
mind, and instead question whether the party seeking to avoid judicial estoppel was
sufficiently aware of the facts giving rise to application of judicial estoppel.
Id. 154 Idaho 896: 303 P.3d 583. Moreover, the court suggests that "full kno\vledge of the

attendant facts'' means that the debtor is ''intimatelyfamiliar \Vith the assets and liabilities of the
community estate .. (i.e. including the potential claims.) Id.
The trial court took an overly simplified and overly broad application of J4cCallister in
this case. No evidence vvas ever submitted to the court to suggest that Houpts were aware of or
should have been aware their claims against \Vells NA or F ATCO prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy. In fact, Houpts did not become aware of such claims until vvell after the bankruptcy
was filed, after their debts had been discharged, and after the stay relief was granted to Wells NA
as to the non-judicial foreclosure. See Statement of Facts, infra. Moreover, Houpts' damages
suffered as a result of Respondents· wrongful disclosure were not fully realized until after the
sale of the Property, finally and fully dispossessing the Houpts of the property.) 5
Most importantly, since the Houpts were not aware of the significance of their claims
until near the end the bankruptcy process, rather than amend their bankruptcy schedules, Houpts

Houpts initially only sought for injunctive relief to prevent the sale from moving
forward. Their damages would only apply after the wrongful non-judicial foreclosure.
5

APPELLANTS' BRIEF - 33

to

an order

bankruptcy estate· s abandonment

its

Houpts' motion v\as unopposed and \Vas granted by the bankruptcy court. R.

the property. 6
4.

Thus. at that time. the bankruptcy estate could not stake any further claim in the '·asset" or
Houpts · claims \Vith regard to the property which had now been abandoned by the bankruptcy
estate.
such, the doctrine of judicial estoppel from a bankruptcy context, i.e. the hiding of
assets from creditors protected by the trustee, no longer applied and in fact became a moot issue.
Further contradicting the judicial estoppel claims are Respondents· actions after the
bankruptcy estate had abandoned its interests in the property. At the same time that Respondents
were asserting judicial estoppel, alleging that Houpts had deprived the bankruptcy trustee from
claims to the property, Respondents were requesting that the court allocate all of the benefits and
proceeds from the voluntary sale of the property to Wells NA R. Vol. 2, p. 306. In other words,
Respondents (\Vells NA) themselves took advantage of the trustee's abandonment of the

property interests by claiming all proceeds from the sale of the property. It was at the very least
an acknmvledgment that the trustee no longer had a right to such assets.
In short, the District Court erred by relying upon Houpts' failure to amend the bankruptcy
schedules in applying the harsh remedy of judicial estoppel, even though at the time amendment
would have been meaningful, Houpts had no knowledge of the significance or potential amount
of those claims.

Its worth noting that prior to the filing of this motion, the trustee was aware of this case
and had at one time filed an affidavit with the District Court with regard to the bankruptcy
estate's interests. R. Vol. 2, pp. 215-16.
6
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The facts in this case are far different and significantly more complex than those of
:\fcCallister and similar decisions that invoh e claims that \\·ere known and fully ripe prior to the

filing of the bankruptcy petition. The comt · s primary consideration should have been whether
Houpts v,Tre knowingly and truly taking an "'inconsistent'' position, or were .. playing fast and
loose with the court, .. in a mmmer that deprived or harmed the bankruptcy estate· s interests.
Since Houpts· claims did not become knmvn and ripe until near the end or even after the
bankruptcy process. and \\here the trustee abandoned his interests in all claims related to Houpts·
interest in the property, there was no concealment of such claims and no harm v\as done.
Regardless. by the time the court decided this issue, the entire issue had become moot.
Judicial estoppel simply does not apply under the specific facts and circumstances of this case,
and this Court should therefore reverse the District Court's decision on that issue.

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED I'.\ AWARDI'.\G ADDITIO'.\AL FEES A'.\D COSTS

In addition to the $60,390.18 in fees and costs awarded in its Memorandum Decision on
Respondents· Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court subsequently awarded an additional
$66,538.50 in fees and $1,564.46 in costs, for a total of$128,493.14 in fees and costs av,:arded to
\\'ells NA in this matter. 7 Sec Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Memorandum of Costs. R.
Vol. 5, p. 1049. This additional avvard was an abuse of the court's discretion.

All in all, the District Court awarded Wells NA no less than $206,383 in benefits from
the sale of the property and $128,493.14 in fees and costs for a total of no less that $334,876.14
for an alleged lien of no more than $62,452.66, $56,250 of which had been paid off through the
SBA's guarantee. In other words, without ever filing a claim in Court, Wells NA was avvarded
$334,875.14 by the Court for at best a $6,200 lien on Houpts' property.
7
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Pursuant to l.R. C.P. § 54( e )( ). the court may award reasonable attorney fees to the
provided

by statute or contract. In determining vvhich party to an

action is a prevailing party, "the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties.'· LR.C.P.

§ 54(d)(l)(B). Such an analysis requires a ·'careful consideration of the relevant factual
circumstances and principles of law. and without arbitrary disregard for those facts and principles
ofjusticc.'· Decker v. Homeguard S):srems. 105 Idaho 158, 161 (Ida. App. 1983 ). Essential to
this analysis is determining vvhich party. if ,my. prevailed. The long standing ·'three principal'·
test for prevailing established in numerous decisions by the Idaho courts. includes the follmving:
(1)
(2)
(3)
.Vgyueb

i·.

The final judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought.
Whether there were multiple claims or issues betvveen the parties, and
The extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues .
Bui, 191 P.3d 1107 (Ida. App. 2008); see also Israel v. Leachman, 139 1daho 24 (Idaho

2003): Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596 (Idaho 2001). In determining the prevailing
party, the Court must take an ''overall vievv·' of the action. Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903,
914,204P.3d1114, 1125 (2009).
In considering the unique circumstances and '·overall view·' of this case, Wells NA
should not have been awarded its fees and costs as the "prevailing party" in the case. 8 The only
reason that Houpts' claims for declaratory relief and damages for wrongful disclosure ·were
dismissed was because the District Court rendered those claims moot because of the voluntary
sale and stipulation entered into by the parties. In other words, had the parties never entered into

Although requested to do so by the District Court, Respondent FA TCO never submitted
its own itemized attorney fees in the case. R. Vol. 5, p. 1051.
8
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stipulation allowing

the property. lfoupts

prevailed on its declaratory

damages for \\TOngful foreclosure. Even under the District Court's rulmgs in this case,
lfoupts should not have had to pay the attorney fees of the other parties simply for "stipulating"
to haYe the Court determine lien rights in lieu of their claims.
Jn addition. the more than $128.000 in fees and costs awarded to \\'ells NA to enforce at
best a $62,000 lien right (without ever having to file a claim in court) was unreasonable if not
utterly outrageous under the criteria set forth under I.R.C.P. § 54(e)(3). Prior to the court's
decision in this case, Defendants represented to the Court that it had incurred '·246 hours in the
representation of \VFB in the Houp ts' bankruptcy proceeding and in enforcing WFB · s rights." R.
Vol. 2, p. 329D,

~

13. Such work was spread out among four attorneys in the office. ld. f 14.

In its Memorandum of Fees and Costs Wells NA allegedly incurred an additional 477.5 hours ··in
the representation of Defendants in these proceedings." Assuming there is no duplication, Wells
NA alleged that it incurred T23 .5 hours of representation (or more than 18 \\eeks of attorney
time) to enforce its rights and obligations under the deed of trust. Id., pp. 329X-MM.
There ,:vas never a trial in this matter. Only one deposition was taken (over two sessions).
That deposition ,vas neYer used by the defendants in any of their motions. The Defendants
proffered no discovery and responded only to one set of discovery (of which there was
substantial resistence precipitating a motion to compel by the Houpts ). Indeed, at the very least
Defendants far exceeded the ·'time and labor required" under I.R.C.P. § 54(e)(3).
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V.

HOUPTS SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL

The underlying transaction in

case involves a loan for commercial

owned by

Houpts. There \Vas no personal or household component to this loan, which \Vas a business
financing loan including the purchase of commercial real property. Thus, this matter clearly
regards a commercial transaction and as such, under Idaho Code § 12-120(3) Houpts should be
mvarded their attorney fees for prevailing on appeal.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. the District Court's decision dismissing Houpts' claims against
Wells NA and FA TCO should be rewrsed and remanded for further proceedings. Also, the
District Court's decision and judgment a\varding monies and benefits to Wells

should

reversed and vacated. Likewise, the District Court's award to Respondents· of its additional fees
and costs should be reversed. Finally. Houpts should be mvarded their attorney fees on appeal.
DATED this 24 th day of March, 2015.
PETERSEN
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